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The Domagala Dilemma-Domagala v. Rolland
Abstract
In Domagala v. Rolland, the Minnesota Supreme Court granted review in a personal injury case that was
dominated by duty and special relationship issues, even though the parties agreed that there was no special
relationship between them. The case, straddling the misfeasance/nonfeasance line, was complicated by the
defense theory (that the lack of a special relationship meant that the defendant owed no duty to protect or
warn the plaintiff), and the plaintiff ’s theory (that the defendant owed a duty of reasonable care to the plaintiff
because he acted affirmatively, even if the risk to the plaintiff did not become apparent until later). At trial, the
result was a set of conflicting and inconsistent jury instructions that in effect permitted Domagala to prove
that Rolland was negligent, except not by either failing to warn or protect Domagala. The result was a defense
verdict. Domagala appealed.
The court of appeals rejected the defense’s theory, accepted the plaintiff ’s, and remanded the case for a new
trial. The supreme court rejected both theories, concluding that a duty existed because the defendant
affirmatively created a foreseeable risk of injury to the plaintiff, and affirmed the court of appeals’s decision to
remand the case for a new trial.
This article takes a close look at Domagala. It sets out the facts, the jury instructions given by the district court,
and the dilemma the instructions created for Domagala in trying to prove that Rolland was negligent without
establishing that Rolland should have warned or protected him. An analysis of the court of appeals and
supreme court opinions follows, including the lessons from,and questions and red flags raised by, the supreme
court’s opinion. The last part is a simple conclusion.
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Duty is not an issue in most negligence cases.  If the defendant 
creates a foreseeable risk of injury, the defendant owes a duty of 
reasonable care with respect to persons or property placed at risk 
because of that conduct.  On occasion, typically where an accident 
occurs in an unusual manner, there may be an argument over 
whether an injury is unforeseeable as a matter of law.1  Sometimes 
policy considerations will counsel against the imposition of a duty, 
even if the injury is foreseeable.2 
The duty issue also becomes problematic if the defendant 
created a risk of injury, even if not negligently, that later resulted in 
foreseeable risk, or if the defendant did not act at all.  In those 
 
       †    Margaret H. and James E. Kelley Professor of Law, William Mitchell 
College of Law. 
 1.  See, e.g., Foss v. Kincade, 766 N.W.2d 317, 322−23 (Minn. 2009) (holding 
that injury to a child climbing on a bookcase at a house where he and his mother 
were visiting was unforeseeable as a matter of law). 
 2.  See Stadler v. Cross, 295 N.W.2d 552, 555 (Minn. 1980) (adhering to the 
zone of danger rule in negligent infliction of emotional distress cases). 
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cases the defendant owes no duty to the plaintiff unless the plaintiff 
establishes an exception to the general no duty rule.3 
Nonfeasance cases often arise in the context of a defendant’s 
failure to use reasonable care to protect the plaintiff from risks, 
which are sometimes created by a third person, but not always.  A 
defendant may have a duty to act for the protection of the plaintiff, 
including warning the plaintiff of potential risks of injury, if there is 
a special relationship between the plaintiff and defendant (or, in 
the case of injury caused by a third person, between the defendant 
and the third person) and the risk of injury is foreseeable.4 
In Domagala v. Rolland,5 the Minnesota Supreme Court granted 
review in a personal injury case that was dominated by duty and 
special relationship issues, even though the parties agreed that 
there was no special relationship between them.  The case, 
straddling the misfeasance/nonfeasance line, was complicated by 
the defense theory (that the lack of a special relationship meant 
that the defendant owed no duty to protect or warn the plaintiff), 
and the plaintiff’s theory (that the defendant owed a duty of 
reasonable care to the plaintiff because he acted affirmatively, even 
if the risk to the plaintiff did not become apparent until later).  At 
trial, the result was a set of conflicting and inconsistent jury 
instructions that in effect permitted Domagala to prove that 
Rolland was negligent, except not by either failing to warn or 
protect Domagala.  The result was a defense verdict.  Domagala 
appealed. 
The court of appeals rejected the defense’s theory, accepted 
the plaintiff’s, and remanded the case for a new trial.  The supreme 
court rejected both theories, concluding that a duty existed 
because the defendant affirmatively created a foreseeable risk of 
injury to the plaintiff, and affirmed the court of appeals’s decision 
to remand the case for a new trial. 
This article takes a close look at Domagala.  It sets out the facts, 
the jury instructions given by the district court, and the dilemma 
the instructions created for Domagala in trying to prove that 
Rolland was negligent without establishing that Rolland should 
have warned or protected him.  An analysis of the court of appeals 
and supreme court opinions follows, including the lessons from, 
 
 3.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND 
EMOTIONAL HARM § 37 (2010). 
 4.  See id. §§ 40−41.  
 5.  805 N.W.2d 14 (Minn. 2011). 
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and questions and red flags raised by, the supreme court’s opinion.  
The last part is a simple conclusion. 
I. THE FACTS 
Domagala was injured when a bucket attachment on a skid 
loader operated by Rolland fell on his left foot crushing three of 
his toes, which were eventually amputated.  Domagala, who was 
married to Rolland’s cousin, engaged Rolland to do some 
landscaping work on his property.  Rolland did not charge 
Domagala for the work, which included finishing the grading on 
his yard.  Rolland, with eight years of experience operating a skid 
loader, brought his skid loader to do the work.  Domagala had no 
experience with skid loaders, so while Rolland did the grading 
work, Domagala picked up rocks and debris around the yard.  The 
skid loader was noisy, so the two communicated through hand 
signals.  If Domagala needed to speak with Rolland he would 
approach the skid loader with his hands raised and Rolland would 
do the same to show that he was not touching the controls.  
Rolland brought three attachments to do the work.  Switching the 
attachments was somewhat difficult, as it involved releasing the pins 
holding the attachments with two release levers, which sometimes 
became jammed with debris.  When one lever was jammed, Rolland 
would manipulate the hydraulics to shake the debris loose from the 
other pin.  It was an admittedly dangerous operation. 
On the day of the accident, Rolland was shaking a bucket 
attachment to dislodge the debris that was jamming one of the 
levers when Domagala approached the skid loader with his hands 
raised.  Rolland raised his hands in response and then without any 
further communication, Domagala removed the rock that was 
jamming the pin.  Domagala then released the jammed lever and 
the bucket fell on his left foot.  Domagala brought suit against 
Rolland. 
At the outset, the case seemed to be simple enough.  The 
defendant created a foreseeable risk of injury to the plaintiff in the 
mode he was using to change the skid loader attachments and 
therefore owed the defendant a duty of reasonable care, including 
a duty to warn of or otherwise protect the plaintiff from the risks of 
coming into close proximity to the skid loader.  That was the 
plaintiff’s theory of the case from the outset.6 
 
 6.  Brief for Respondent at 1, Domagala, 805 N.W.2d 14 (No. A09-1945), 
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II. THE JURY INSTRUCTIONS 
Had the district court determined that Domagala owed a duty 
of reasonable care to Rolland, instructed the jury using the pattern 
jury instruction on negligence,7 which would have applied to both 
Domagala and Rolland, and submitted special verdict questions 
covering Rolland’s and Domagala’s negligence, the case would 
have been relatively uncomplicated—at least in terms of the legal 
standards, if not the facts. 
That was not what happened, however.  The defendant’s 
theory from the outset was that there was no duty to warn or 
protect the plaintiff in absence of a special relationship between 
the defendant and plaintiff.  To drive home the point, Rolland 
requested two jury instructions implementing the theory. 
The first instruction, focusing on the impact of a lack of a 
special relationship between the plaintiff and defendant, advised 
the jury that the defendant had no duty to protect the plaintiff: 
No Duty to Protect 
A person generally has no duty to act for the protection of 
another person.  A legal duty to protect will be found to 
exist only if there is a special relationship between the 
parties and the risk is foreseeable.  The Court has ruled, 
as a matter of law, that no duty to protect exists in this 
matter and you must not consider such a duty in your 
deliberation in this case.8 
The second instruction told the jury that special relationships 
giving rise to a duty to warn arise in only limited cases, and that the 
lack of a special relationship meant that the defendant owed no 
duty to warn the plaintiff: 
No Duty to Warn 
A special relationship giving rise to a duty to warn is only 
found on the part of common carriers, innkeepers, 
possessors of land who hold it open to the public, and 
persons who have custody of another person under 
circumstances in which that other person is deprived of 
normal opportunities of self-protection.  The Court has 
ruled, as a matter of law, that no duty to warn exists in this 
 
2011 WL 7415264, at *1. 
 7.  See 4 Michael K. Steenson & Peter B. Knapp, MINNESOTA PRACTICE: JURY 
INSTRUCTION GUIDES - CIVIL, § 25.10 (5th ed. 2006). 
 8.  Domagala, 805 N.W.2d at 20.  
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matter and you must not consider such a duty in your 
deliberation in this case.9 
The district court also gave the plaintiff’s requested instruction that 
mirrored the language of section 321 of the Restatement (Second) 
of Torts10: 
Duty of Care Based on the Creation of a Dangerous Situation 
If a person created an unreasonable risk of causing 
physical harm to another, that person has a duty to 
exercise reasonable care to prevent the risk from taking 
effect.  This duty applies, even though at the time of the 
creation of the unreasonable risk, the person had no 
reason to believe that it would involve such a risk.11 
The district court also gave the pattern jury instruction on 
reasonable care.12 
The first two instructions told the jury that because there was 
no special relationship between Domagala and Rolland, Rolland 
had no duty to protect Rolland or warn him of the risk in 
detaching the bucket.  The third told the jury that Rolland owed 
the plaintiff a duty to use reasonable care to prevent a risk from 
taking effect, even if Rolland was not negligent in creating the risk 
in the first place.  The district court found Domagala’s attempt in 
closing argument to explain special relationships to be 
objectionable and reread the instructions, save for the no-duty-to-
protect instruction.13  The jury, confused by the instructions, asked 
the district court for clarification on the duty-to-warn instruction, 
 
 9.  Id.  
 10.  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 321 (1965). 
 11.  Domagala, 805 N.W.2d at 20. 
 12.  Id. at 20–21; see also 4 STEENSON & KNAPP, supra note 7, § 25.10.  The 
negligence instruction reads in pertinent part as follows: 
Definition of “reasonable care” 
Reasonable care is the care a reasonable person would use in the same or 
similar circumstances. 
Definition of “negligence” 
Negligence is the failure to use reasonable care.  Ask yourself what a 
reasonable person would have done in these circumstances.  Negligence 
occurs when a person: 
       1. Does something a reasonable person would not do; or 
       2. Fails to do something a reasonable person would do. 
 13.  During closing arguments, Domagala focused on what a reasonable 
person would have done under the circumstances.  He also attempted to explain 
the source of language in the instructions by explaining special relationships in 
negligence law.  The district court found the argument objectionable and reread 
all the instructions except the no-duty-to-protect instruction.  Domagala, 805 
N.W.2d at 21. 
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but the court told the jury to rely on the instructions as given.14  
The jury found for the defendant.15 
III. DOMAGALA’S DILEMMA 
In light of the instructions, Domagala’s dilemma was to 
convince the jury that the defendant was negligent in the failure to 
exercise reasonable care for his protection, but without being able 
to show that Rolland either failed to warn him or to protect him 
(had the jury followed the district court’s rereading of the 
instructions exactly, it could have found negligence in the failure to 
protect, although how Rolland might have done that without 
warning Domagala obviously has its problems).  On appeal, both 
the court of appeals and supreme court struggled with the 
consequences of the dilemma, which—more sharply defined—is 
whether a defendant who is not in a special relationship with the 
plaintiff may nonetheless owe a duty to the plaintiff to warn of risks 
created by the defendant or to take other precautions for the 
plaintiff’s safety. 
The origin of the dilemma was a flawed syllogism advanced by 
Rolland and accepted in part by the district court.  This is the 
argument: 
(1)  A defendant who is in a special relationship with a plaintiff 
has a duty to warn or protect the plaintiff. 
(2)  Rolland and Domagala were not in a special relationship. 
(3) Rolland therefore owed no duty to Domagala to warn or 
protect him. 
The first premise is an accurate statement of the law, but it is 
incomplete.  The second premise is accurate.  The conclusion is 
not accurate, because the first premise is an incomplete statement 
of the law.  To be accurate, the first premise would have to state 
that a defendant who is in a special relationship with a plaintiff has 
a duty to warn or protect the plaintiff, but a defendant who 
affirmatively creates a risk of injury to the plaintiff owes a duty to 
the plaintiff to warn or protect the plaintiff from the risk of injury. 
The key issue facing the Minnesota Court of Appeals and 
Minnesota Supreme Court was the validity of the conclusion that 
 
 14.  During deliberations, the jury asked the trial judge if “no duty to warn” 
meant “that the defendant had no obligation to try to keep the plaintiff away from 
the skid loader?”  The trial judge replied: “I cannot give you further instruction on 
this.  Please rely on the jury instructions provided to you.”  Id.   
 15.  Id. 
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Rolland owed no duty to Domagala because of the lack of a special 
relationship between them.  Both courts rejected the notion that 
lack of a special relationship should be preemptive on the duty 
issue, although on slightly different grounds.  The following issues 
were, if Rolland owed a duty to Domagala absent a special 
relationship, what the basis was for the duty; if there was a duty, 
whether the duty of reasonable care could include a duty to warn; 
and finally, whether the jury instructions were sufficiently 
prejudicial to require reversal. 
IV. DOMAGALA IN THE MINNESOTA COURT OF APPEALS 
The court of appeals concluded that there was no special 
relationship between the parties, which remained an uncontested 
point.16  In an attempt to circumvent the dilemma, Domagala 
argued that Rolland had a duty to warn based on a products 
liability analogy, because Rolland effectively created a “dangerous 
product” when he permitted the bucket to hang by a single pin.17  
The court of appeals rejected the theory because Domagala was 
obviously not a product seller or distributor.18 
Domagala argued that the case was analogous to a products 
liability case, not that it was a products liability case.  Products 
liability cases, more broadly, could simply be viewed as just one 
category of cases in which a class of defendants (product sellers) 
could be held liable for creating a risk of injury to product users 
and failing to warn users of the risk.19  Products liability cases are 
really just negligence cases, after all,20 and if there is a duty to warn 
in products liability cases, there should be a duty to warn in 
Domagala’s case.  It was easier to reject the argument and potential 
muddling of products liability theory based upon the fact that 
Rolland was not a product seller, rather than dealing with the 
broader suggestion that this case was just an example of a 
defendant creating a risk of injury, which triggers a duty to exercise 
reasonable care.  The court of appeals ultimately ended up finding 
a duty anyway, even after rejecting the products liability analogy. 
 
 16.  Domagala v. Rolland, 787 N.W.2d 662, 668 (Minn. Ct. App. 2010). 
 17.  Id. at 668–69. 
 18.  Id. at 669. 
 19.  See id. 
 20.  See, e.g., Germann v. F.L. Smithe Mach. Co., 395 N.W.2d 922, 926 n.4 
(Minn. 1986) (warning claims); Bilotta v. Kelley Co., 346 N.W.2d 616, 622 (Minn. 
1984) (design defect claims). 
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The court of appeals affirmed the district court’s ruling on the 
special relationship issue because Domagala did not identify a 
special relationship between the parties and because Rolland did 
not have a duty to warn under products liability principles.  But 
there was more.  Domagala argued that the no-duty-to-warn and no-
duty-to-protect instructions were inappropriate because the use of 
negative jury instructions is not appropriate, the use of generalized 
instructions is preferred to specific instructions, and the 
instructions unduly emphasized Rolland’s case and were confusing 
to the jury.21 
The court of appeals recognized the inconsistency in the law 
concerning the use of general versus special instructions and also 
that there are no standardized instructions on no-duty-to-warn or 
protect.22  The court concluded that because of the broad 
discretion district courts have in instructing juries, the no-duty-to-
warn and no-duty-to-protect instructions were not an abuse of the 
district court’s discretion as Rolland, in fact, did not owe Domagala 
a specific duty to warn or protect him.23  The court also concluded 
that, because the jury instructions did not misstate the law, it was 
not an abuse of the district court’s discretion to frame the 
instructions in the negative.24 
Having resolved those issues in favor of Rolland, largely based 
on the obvious necessity of giving district courts latitude in framing 
jury instructions,25 the court of appeals considered whether the 
instructions, as a whole, misstated or confused an applicable 
principle of law.26  The court agreed with Domagala’s argument 
that “the jury instructions were self-conflicting, overemphasized 
respondent’s legal theory, and gave the jury an erroneous 
impression of the law.”27  The court of appeals arrived at that 
conclusion because Rolland owed Domagala “a general duty to 
exercise reasonable care and a duty to exercise reasonable care to 
prevent harm to [Domagala] when [Rolland] created an 
admittedly dangerous situation.”28 
 
 21.  Domagala, 787 N.W.2d at 670. 
 22.  Id.  
 23.  Id. 
 24.  Id. at 671. 
 25.  Id. at 670. 
 26.  Id. at 671. 
 27.  Id. 
 28.  Id. at 672. 
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The court initially relied on section 321 of the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts to support its conclusion that “[t]he exercise of 
reasonable care upon the creation of a dangerous situation may 
include giving a warning to anyone placed at risk.”29  Section 321 of 
the Second Restatement reads as follows: 
(1) If the actor does an act, and subsequently realizes or 
should realize that it has created an unreasonable risk of 
causing physical harm to another, he is under a duty to 
exercise reasonable care to prevent the risk from taking 
effect. 
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies even though 
at the time of the act the actor has no reason to believe 
that it will involve such a risk.30 
The court cited comment a to section 321, which states that 
subsection (1) “applies whenever the actor realizes or should 
realize that his act has created a condition which involves an 
unreasonable risk of harm to another, or is leading to 
consequences which involve such a risk.”31  The Restatement 
includes several illustrations of the application of section 321.  In 
the first: 
A is playing golf.  He sees no one on or near a putting 
green and drives to it.  While the ball is in the air, B, 
another player, suddenly appears from a bunker directly 
in the line of A’s drive.  A is under a duty to shout a 
warning to B.32 
In the illustration, the golfer creating the risk was unaware at 
the time that his action created a risk of injury, but upon realizing 
that it did, he had a duty to warn B.  After noting the illustration, 
the court of appeals then sandwiched in a statement that the no-
duty-to-warn instruction—coupled with the obligation to use 
reasonable care upon discovery of a dangerous condition—
confused the jury,33 before stating that it would use the framework 
of the supreme court’s decision in Zylka v. Leikvoll34 to analyze the 
duty-to-warn issue. 
 
 29.  Id. 
 30.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 321 (1965). 
 31.  Domagala, 787 N.W.2d at 672 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 
§ 321 cmt. a (1965)). 
 32.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 321 cmt. a, illus. 1 (1965). 
 33.  Domagala, 787 N.W.2d at 672. 
 34.  274 Minn. 435, 144 N.W.2d 358 (1966). 
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Zylka was a factually complicated case in which a tow truck 
operator (Leikvoll) created a risk of injury, although not 
negligently, but subsequently was negligent in failing to adequately 
warn of the risk created by the dangerous situation.  The tow truck 
operator created a dangerous situation as to the second collision 
under the law of the case.35  The district court in the case instructed 
the jury: 
If a person creates or participates in creating a dangerous 
situation on a highway, he is under a common law duty to 
use reasonable care to remove or correct the situation to 
the extent that that is reasonably feasible or possible, and 
to use reasonable care to warn others of the danger while 
the danger exists.36 
The supreme court stated in Zylka: 
We believe, and find support for the proposition, that 
one’s participation in the creation of a hazard need not 
be negligent for the duty of care to arise.  Though not 
negligent, it is clear that Leikvoll was a participant in the 
creation of the first accident when, in performing a 
contract to start [the] car, the latter became involved in a 
collision.  A duty then fell upon Leikvoll, not as a 
volunteer but as one called upon to exercise reasonable 
care, either to remove the hazard or give adequate 
warning to others.37 
The court of appeals in Domagala applied the Zylka framework, 
concluding: 
[A]bsent the no-duty-to-warn instruction, the jury could 
have found respondent’s exercise of reasonable care 
included shouting a warning to appellant or attempting to 
wave appellant back.  Therefore, because the exercise of 
reasonable care upon the creation of a dangerous 
situation may include giving a warning to the at-risk party 
and in light of the jury’s question, we are persuaded by 
 
 35.  Id. at 446, 144 N.W.2d at 366. 
 36.  Id. at 447, 144 N.W.2d at 367. 
 37.  Id. (footnote omitted).  The court of appeals in Domagala also cited 
illustration 3 from the Second Restatement, which seems factually similar to Zylka: 
A, carefully driving his truck, skids on an icy road, and his truck comes to 
rest in a position across the highway where he is unable to move it.  A fails 
to take any steps to warn approaching vehicles of the blocked highway.  B, driving 
his automobile with reasonable care, does not see the truck, skids on the 
ice and collides with it, and is injured.  A is subject to liability to B.   
Domagala, 787 N.W.2d at 673 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 321     
cmt. a, illus. 3 (1965)). 
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appellant’s argument that the no-duty-to-warn and no-
duty-to-protect instructions confused the negligence 
principles at issue here.38 
It could be argued that Rolland was not negligent in creating 
the risk to Domagala at the outset but was negligent in failing to 
warn Domagala of the risk when he realized that Domagala could 
be injured, or that Rolland negligently created the risk at the 
outset.  As in Zylka, it would seem to make little difference which 
view of the case was adopted. 
Based on its reading of Zylka, the court of appeals was 
persuaded that “because the exercise of reasonable care upon the 
creation of a dangerous situation may include giving a warning to 
the at-risk party and in light of the jury’s question [on warnings] . . 
. the no-duty-to-warn and no-duty-to-protect instructions confused 
the negligence principles at issue here.”39  Finally, the court held 
that the instructions were sufficiently prejudicial to justify granting 
a new trial to Domagala.40 
V. DOMAGALA IN THE SUPREME COURT OF MINNESOTA 
On appeal to the Minnesota Supreme Court, Rolland 
continued to maintain that there could be no duty to warn absent a 
special relationship.41  Domagala abandoned the products-liability-
by-analogy argument, but continued to maintain that a general 
duty of reasonable care existed because Rolland created a risk of 
injury, and that it was irrelevant (based on section 321 of the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts and Zylka) that Rolland may not 
have been negligent in creating the risk at the outset.42 
The supreme court initially stated that “[t]his negligence case 
requires us to decide whether the failure to warn others of 
foreseeable harm created by the defendant’s conduct can 
constitute negligence absent a special relationship between the 
parties.”43  The answer seems obvious.  Of course a defendant who 
creates a foreseeable risk of harm has to exercise reasonable care 
 
 38.  Domagala, 787 N.W.2d at 673. 
 39.  Id. 
 40.  Id. at 673–75. 
 41.  Brief for Appellant at 13–17, Domagala v. Rolland, 805 N.W.2d 14 (Minn. 
2011) (No. A09-1945), 2010 WL 8435272 at *13–17. 
 42.  Brief for Respondent at 16–19, Domagala, 805 N.W.2d 14, 2011 WL 
7415264 at *16–19. 
 43.  Domagala, 805 N.W.2d at 18. 
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for the protection of a plaintiff who is exposed to that risk.  
Warning may constitute reasonable care.  It is hornbook law.44 
But getting to that conclusion required the supreme court to 
resolve the flawed syllogism at the core of Domagala’s dilemma.  
Step one of the court’s opinion was to determine whether Rolland 
owed a duty to Domagala. 
It is clear that in nonfeasance cases a defendant owes no duty 
to the plaintiff absent a special relationship or some other 
exception to the general no duty rule.45  If a defendant affirmatively 
creates a foreseeable risk of injury to another person, however, the 
defendant has a duty to use reasonable care for the protection of 
that person.  Rolland’s argument went beyond that by arguing that 
an earlier Minnesota Supreme Court case, Harper v. Herman,46 
controlled the outcome by preempting any argument that he had a 
duty to warn or protect the plaintiff. 
The plaintiff in Harper was severely injured when he dived off a 
boat into shallow water.  One of the issues was whether the boat 
operator, who was familiar with the area where the boat was 
anchored and knew that the water was dangerously shallow, had a 
duty to warn the plaintiff of the dangers of diving at that spot.  The 
supreme court held that he did not: 
We have previously stated that an affirmative duty to act 
only arises when a special relationship exists between the 
parties.  “The fact that an actor realizes or should realize 
that action on his part is necessary for another’s aid or 
protection does not of itself impose upon him a duty to 
take such action . . . unless a special relationship exists . . . 
between the actor and the other which gives the other the 
right to protection.”47 
 
 44.  See, e.g., DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 227 (2000). 
 45.  Id. § 314.  Section 37 of the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for 
Physical and Emotional Harm provides that “[a]n actor whose conduct has not 
created a risk of physical . . . harm to another has no duty of care to the other 
unless a court determines that one of the affirmative duties provided in §§ 38–44 is 
applicable.”  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL 
HARM § 37 (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005).  Sections 40 and 41 are the special 
relationship sections.  
 46.  499 N.W.2d 472 (Minn. 1993). 
 47.  Id. at 474 (quoting Delgado v. Lohmar, 289 N.W.2d 479, 483 (Minn. 
1979)).  It could be argued that Herman did in fact create a risk by mooring his 
boat in shallow water where there was a risk to divers without telling people in the 
boat that it was risky.  There would have been no issue concerning Herman’s duty 
had the court read it that way, but it did not. 
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The court in Harper cited its opinion in Delgado v. Lohmar48 for 
the proposition that even where a person realizes that he or she 
must take action to avoid injury to another, a special relationship is 
required before a duty to act will be imposed.  Delgado, like Harper, 
was a nonfeasance case.  The problem arose because Rolland 
argued that Harper should be construed to mean that while there is 
a duty to warn in special relationship cases, there is no duty to warn 
absent a special relationship. 
The supreme court in Domagala broke the duty analysis into 
two parts.  The first part covered the duty to warn.  The supreme 
court saw the case as a request “to formally recognize and clarify 
the distinction between the specific duty to warn that arises when 
the parties stand in a special relationship and the duty to warn that 
constitutes an exercise of the general duty of reasonable care.”49 
In its opening analysis of the issue, the supreme court 
recognized the standard common law distinction between 
misfeasance and nonfeasance, observing that “[t]he distinction 
between the specific duty to warn and exercising reasonable care by 
giving a warning likely stems from the historical divergence of 
liability for misfeasance and nonfeasance.”50 
The court saw the duty to act with reasonable care for the 
protection of others implicated in two ways in Domagala: 
First, echoing the principles of liability for misfeasance, 
general negligence law imposes a general duty of 
reasonable care when the defendant’s own conduct 
creates a foreseeable risk of injury to a foreseeable 
plaintiff. . . . 
 Second, a defendant owes a duty to protect a plaintiff 
when action by someone other than the defendant creates 
a foreseeable risk of harm to the plaintiff and the 
defendant and plaintiff stand in a special relationship.51 
In making the distinction, the court had to resolve Rolland’s 
Harper argument.  In doing so, the supreme court first referenced 
Harper’s partial quotation of Delgado: 
We have previously stated that an affirmative duty to act 
only arises when a special relationship exists between the 
parties.  “The fact that an actor realizes or should realize 
 
 48.  289 N.W.2d 479 (Minn. 1979). 
 49.  Domagala v. Rolland, 805 N.W.2d 14, 22 (Minn. 2011). 
 50.  Id. 
 51.  Id. at 23 (citation omitted). 
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that action on his part is necessary for another’s aid or 
protection does not of itself impose upon him a duty to 
take such action . . . unless a special relationship exists . . . 
between the actor and the other which gives the other the 
right to protection.”52 
The court then got to the core of the problem presented by 
Rolland’s Harper argument: 
But to hold that Harper prohibits a breach of the duty of 
reasonable care based on a failure to warn, in addition to 
the imposition of a specific duty to warn absent a special 
relationship, would require us to read Harper out of 
context and apply its holding too broadly.  A correct 
application of our analysis in Harper must be mindful of 
the historical distinction between misfeasance stemming 
from an actor’s own conduct and nonfeasance when 
someone other than the defendant creates the harm.53 
Of course!  Rolland’s construction of Harper is overbroad, given any 
reading of the case, but the supreme court in Domagala thought 
that Harper’s quotation from Delgado, which it characterized as the 
court’s “seminal special relationship case,”54 was incomplete.  As the 
court in Domagala noted,55 the full quote from Delgado reads as 
follows: 
The fact that an actor realizes or should realize that action 
on his part is necessary for another’s aid or protection 
does not of itself impose upon him a duty to take such 
action.  Ordinarily, there is no duty to control the conduct of a 
third person to prevent him from causing physical harm to 
another unless a special relationship exists, either between 
the actor and the third person which imposes a duty to 
control, or between the actor and the other which gives 
the other the right to protection.56 
In distancing Harper’s facts from the facts in its case, the Domagala 
court emphasized that in Harper, the defendant boat-owner did not 
create the risk of injury to the plaintiff.  Rather, the plaintiff 
created the risk in diving into water of an unknown depth.  In light 
of those facts, the court revised Harper to stand for the proposition 
 
 52.  Id. at 24 (quoting Harper, 499 N.W.2d at 474 (alterations in original) 
(quoting Delgado, 289 N.W.2d at 483)). 
 53.  Id. 
 54.  Id. 
 55.  Id. 
 56.  Delgado, 289 N.W.2d at 483 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
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“that ‘an affirmative duty to act [to warn plaintiffs of harm created 
by someone other than the defendant] only arises when a special 
relationship exists between the parties.’”57 
Thus, clarified by the supreme court, Harper stands for the 
proposition that a duty to warn in cases involving risks created by 
third persons exists only if there is a special relationship between 
the plaintiff and defendant.  It is obvious, then, that it has no 
application in Domagala, where the risk of injury was not created by 
a third person.  The syllogism is busted. 
Having put Harper aside, the court considered the second step 
in its duty analysis: whether Rolland owed Domagala a general duty 
of reasonable care.  The district court and court of appeals applied 
section 321 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts to the issue.58  
Section 321 provides: 
(1) If the actor does an act, and subsequently realizes or 
should realize that it has created an unreasonable risk of 
causing physical harm to another, he is under a duty to 
exercise reasonable care to prevent the risk from taking 
effect. 
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies even though 
at the time of the act the actor has no reason to believe 
that it will involve such a risk.59 
Comment a of section 321 states that the rule applies “whenever 
the actor realizes or should realize that his act has created a 
condition which involves an unreasonable risk of harm to another, 
or is leading to consequences which involve such a risk . . . whether 
the original act is tortious or innocent.”60  In explaining how 
section 321 works, the court of appeals referred to the first and 
third illustrations in comment a: 
1.  A is playing golf.  He sees no one on or near a putting 
green and drives to it.  While the ball is in the air, B, 
another player, suddenly appears from a bunker directly 
in the line of A’s drive.  A is under a duty to shout a 
warning to B. 
. . . . 
 
 57.  Domagala, 805 N.W.2d at 24 (alteration in original) (quoting Harper, 499 
N.W.2d at 474).  
 58.  Domagala v. Rolland, 787 N.W.2d 662, 672 (Minn. Ct. App. 2010). 
 59.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 321 (1965). 
 60.  Id. § 321 cmt. a. 
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3.  A, carefully driving his truck, skids on an icy road, and 
his truck comes to rest in a position across the highway 
where he is unable to move it.  A fails to take any steps to 
warn approaching vehicles of the blocked highway.  B, 
driving his automobile with reasonable care, does not see 
the truck, skids on the ice and collides with it, and is 
injured.  A is subject to liability to B.61 
As the illustrations demonstrate, a person who creates a risk of 
injury, even if not negligently, is subject to liability for failure to 
warn another who may be injured because of the person’s conduct. 
The supreme court was uneasy with the principle adopted in 
section 321.  The court stated that section 321 has been heavily 
criticized in multiple jurisdictions because of the vagueness and 
over-inclusiveness of the section, the lack of a clearly defined 
standard, and its failure to address policy concerns.62  Ultimately, 
the court stated that 
[b]ecause it is not necessary to adopt section 321 to 
recognize the duty imposed on Rolland or to resolve the 
issues before us, and because of the significant public 
policy concerns surrounding section 321, we decline at 
this time to adopt Restatement (Second) of Torts § 321 as 
a basis for imposing a duty of care in a negligence claim.63 
Somewhat ironically, the Reporter’s Note to section 321 states 
that the first illustration was based upon the Minnesota Supreme 
Court’s decision in Hollinbeck v. Downey,64 a golfing accident case in 
which the defendant hit a ball on a practice fairway, endangering a 
caddy who was on that fairway shagging golf balls for another 
 
 61.  Id. § 321 cmt. a, illus. 1, 3.  Illustration 2 reads as follows: 
A, reasonably believing his automobile to be in good order, lends it to B 
to use on the following day.  The same night A’s chauffeur tells him that 
the steering gear is in dangerously bad condition.  A could readily 
telephone B and warn him of the defective steering gear but neglects to 
do so.  B drives the car the following day, the steering gear breaks and 
the car gets out of control, causing a collision with the car of C in which 
B and C are hurt.  A is subject to liability to B and C. 
Id. § 321 cmt. a, illus. 2. 
 62.  Domagala, 805 N.W.2d at 25.  In contrast, the Reporters’ Note to section 
39 of the Restatement (Third) of Torts, which supersedes sections 321 and 322 of 
the Restatement (Second) of Torts, states that “[t]he principle expressed in         
§§ 321–322 of the Second Restatement of Torts has been widely accepted and 
applied in the courts . . . .”  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:  LIABILITY FOR 
PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 39, Reporters’ Note, cmt. d (Proposed Final 
Draft No. 1 2005). 
 63.  Domagala, 805 N.W.2d at 26.   
 64.  261 Minn. 481, 113 N.W.2d 9 (1962). 
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player.  The presence of the inexperienced fourteen-and-one-half-
year-old plaintiff, combined with Downey’s lack of skill, created 
some risk of injury to the plaintiff.  When Downey, and the golf 
professional who was instructing him, realized the caddie was in the 
path of the ball Downey hit, they yelled “fore,” but it was too late.  
The court held that Downey owed the plaintiff a duty under the 
circumstances: 
If Downey knew, or in the exercise of ordinary care should 
have known, that plaintiff was in a zone of danger and was 
unaware of Downey’s intention to hit, Downey should 
have given him a warning or desisted from striking the 
ball until plaintiff was in a place of safety.  It is our 
opinion that it was a question for the jury to pass upon.65 
The Minnesota Supreme Court, commenting on Hollinbeck in 
Grisim v. TapeMark Charity Pro-Am Golf Tournament,66 stated that if 
defendant Downey “knew, or in the exercise of ordinary care 
should have known, that plaintiff was in a zone of danger and was 
unaware of Downey’s intention to hit, Downey should have given 
[plaintiff] a warning.”67  The supreme court in Domagala did cite 
Hollinbeck, but as an example of a case in which a defendant owed a 
duty to the plaintiff because the defendant created a foreseeable 
risk of injury.68 
It would have been equally easy for the supreme court in 
Domagala to conclude that it had previously recognized section 
321’s principle in Hollinbeck, and that Hollinbeck had in fact 
provided partial authority for section 321.  The court would have 
noted the authorities adopting section 321, and in distinguishing 
the authorities rejecting it, conclude that where courts had refused 
to adopt section 321, they may have done so for reasons of 
principle or policy that were inapplicable on the facts in Domagala.  
That is not the route the court took, however. 
Having concluded that section 321 could not provide the basis 
for imposing a duty on the defendant, the court noted that “a duty 
can be imposed under other general negligence principles found 
in common law.”69  In a mix-and-match, the court set out varying 
approaches to the duty question.  The court first observed that: 
 
 65.  Id. at 486, 113 N.W.2d at 12–13. 
 66.  415 N.W.2d 874, 876 (Minn. 1987) (quoting Hollinbeck, 261 Minn. at 486, 
113 N.W.2d at 12–13). 
 67.  Id. 
 68.  Domagala, 805 N.W.2d at 26. 
 69.  Id. 
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Under common law principles, courts generally have 
considered the following factors when determining 
whether a defendant owed a duty of care: (1) the 
foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, (2) the connection 
between the defendant’s conduct and the injury suffered, 
(3) the moral blame attached to the defendant’s conduct, 
(4) the policy of preventing future harm, and (5) the 
burden to the defendant and community of imposing a 
duty to exercise care with resulting liability for breach.70 
A multi-factor approach has been adopted in most states, including 
those noted by the court in Domagala, although there are numerous 
variations.71 
Then, in apparent contrast, the supreme court set out the 
Minnesota approach to duty: 
In Minnesota, the duty to exercise reasonable care arises 
from the probability or foreseeability of injury to the 
plaintiff.  In other words, when a person acts in some 
manner that creates a foreseeable risk of injury to 
another, the actor is charged with an affirmative duty to 
exercise reasonable care to prevent his conduct from 
harming others.  To determine whether risk of injury 
from the defendant’s conduct is foreseeable we “look at 
whether the specific danger was objectively reasonable to 
expect, not simply whether it was within the realm of any 
conceivable possibility.”72 
 
 70.  Id. 
 71.  See W. Jonathan Cardi, The Hidden Legacy of Palsgraf: Modern Duty Law in 
Microcosm, 91 B.U. L. REV. 1873, 1878 (2011).  The most common factors include: 
(1) the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, (2) the degree of certainty 
that the plaintiff suffered injury, (3) the closeness of the connection 
between the defendant’s conduct and the injury suffered, (4) the moral 
blame attached to the defendant’s conduct, (5) the policy of preventing 
future harm, (6) the extent of the burden to the defendant and 
consequences to the community of imposing a duty to exercise care with 
resulting liability for breach, and (7) the availability, cost, and prevalence 
of insurance for the risk involved. 
Id.  Cardi notes that the formulation is drawn from the California Supreme 
Court’s decisions in Rowland v. Christian, 443 P.2d 561, 564 (Cal. 1968) and 
Biakanja v. Irving, 320 P.2d 16, 19 (Cal. 1958).  Id.  While the treatise cited by the 
court in Domagala notes that the five-factor approach is the approach generally 
taken in deciding duty issues, Cardi notes that the California Supreme Court 
approach is actually a minority approach to the issue.  Cardi, supra, at 1882−83; see 
also Domagala, 805 N.W.2d 14.  Cardi notes that courts have considered no less 
than forty-two factors that are relevant to the duty determination.  Cardi, supra, at 
1882–83. 
 72.  Domagala, 805 N.W.2d at 26 (citations omitted) (quoting Foss v. Kincade, 
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The last part of the duty determination comes from Foss v. 
Kincade,73 which cited the supreme court’s decision in Whiteford v. 
Yamaha Motor Corp., U.S.A.74  The statement that the “specific 
danger” must have been “objectively reasonable to expect” was 
adopted by the supreme court in 1998, but it was not based on any 
prior Minnesota Supreme Court opinion.  Instead, it was drawn 
from an older Missouri Supreme Court opinion that did not exactly 
say that.75  The restrictive foreseeable risk formulation has been 
repeatedly cited by the appellate courts in Minnesota.76 
A few paragraphs later, however, the court said that the test for 
duty “is not whether the precise nature and manner of the 
plaintiff’s injury was foreseeable, but whether ‘the possibility of an 
accident was clear to the person of ordinary prudence.’”77  The 
court went on to state the settled proposition that it has “imposed a 
duty of reasonable care to prevent foreseeable harm when the 
defendant’s conduct creates a dangerous situation.”78 
The duty formulations vary.  Putting aside the policy factors, 
the key variance is the test to determine whether a risk of injury is 
foreseeable.  Which formulation is used—the more specific 
statement from Whiteford versus the more general statement in Zylka 
v. Leikvoll79—could be outcome-determinative in a given case.  A 
court that is inclined to conclude that a risk is unforeseeable may 
use the narrower, more restrictive standard from Whiteford to justify 
its conclusion.  A court inclined to conclude that the risk is either 
foreseeable as a matter of law or in dispute may rely on the broader 
standard.80 
 
766 N.W.2d 317, 322 (Minn. 2009)). 
 73.  766 N.W.2d at 322. 
 74.  582 N.W.2d 916, 918 (Minn. 1998). 
 75.  See Mike Steenson, Minnesota Negligence Law and the Restatement (Third) of 
Torts: Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm, 37 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1055, 
1101–02 (2011). 
 76.  See, e.g., Stuedemann v. Nose, 713 N.W.2d 79, 84 (Minn. Ct. App. 2006); 
Laska v. Anoka Cnty., 696 N.W.2d 133, 140 (Minn. Ct. App. 2005); Kuhl v. Heinen, 
672 N.W.2d 590, 593 (Minn. Ct. App. 2003). 
 77.  Domagala, 805 N.W.2d at 27 (quoting Connolly v. Nicollet Hotel, 254 
Minn. 373, 382, 95 N.W.2d 657, 664 (1959)).  The citation to Connolly seems to 
bring the court closer to its more traditional statement of when duty arises. 
 78.  Id. at 26.  The court’s cases taking that position date back more than one 
hundred years.  See, e.g., Christianson v. Chicago, St. P., M. & O. Ry. Co., 67 Minn. 
94, 97, 69 N.W. 640, 641 (1896); Schubert v. J. R. Clark Co., 49 Minn. 331, 51 N.W. 
1103 (1892). 
 79.  274 Minn. 435, 447, 144 N.W.2d 358, 367 (1966).  
 80.  This is not intended to denigrate the decision-making process.  The key 
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A. Duty, Foreseeability, and the Judge/Jury Relationship 
The supreme court reiterated its standard position that 
foreseeability “is a threshold issue related to duty81 that is ordinarily 
‘properly decided by the court prior to submitting the case to the 
jury,’”82 although in close cases it is a jury issue.83  Then, “[b]ecause 
the parties do not allege, and the record does not suggest, that this 
case presents a close question of foreseeability,”84 the court 
reviewed the foreseeability issue de novo, asking whether, in looking 
at the defendant’s conduct, “it was objectively reasonable to expect 
the specific danger causing the plaintiff’s injury.”85 
In a footnote that continued the discussion on the judge/jury 
relationship with respect to the foreseeability issue,86 the court 
commented on its 2009 opinion in Foss v. Kincade.87  The court in 
Domagala stated that Foss accurately said that “foreseeability of harm 
can be decided by the court as a matter of law when the issue is 
clear,” but that the court in Foss suggested without explaining that 
“in most cases the question of foreseeability is an issue for the 
jury.”88  The court’s concern with Foss demonstrates a recurring 
problem in Minnesota negligence cases regarding the judge/jury 
relationship with respect to duty and foreseeability. 
The courts sometimes say that because duty is a question of law 
for the court, foreseeability as a threshold issue is more properly 
decided by the courts, and sometimes the courts say that the 
foreseeability issue should be decided by the court as a matter of 
law when the issue is clear.  Then there is the statement in Foss that 
the foreseeability issue is a question for the jury in most cases, a 
statement rejected by the court in Domagala as without foundation. 
 
is whether a decision departs from decision-making norms.  See John E. Simonett, 
The Use of the Term “Result-Oriented” to Characterize Appellate Decisions, 10 WM. 
MITCHELL L. REV. 187, 209 (1984).  Using variant standards to resolve duty issues, 
while perhaps inconsistent, is not result-oriented in the pejorative sense. 
 81.  Boone v. Martinez, 567 N.W.2d 508, 510 (Minn. 1997); Cooney v. Hooks, 
535 N.W.2d 609, 612 (Minn. 1995) (citing Alholm v. Wilt, 394 N.W.2d 488, 491 n.5 
(Minn. 1986)). 
 82.  Domagala, 805 N.W.2d at 27 (quoting Alholm, 394 N.W.2d at 491 n.5).  
 83.  Id. (citing Whiteford v. Yamaha Motor Corp., U.S.A., 582 N.W.2d 916, 
918 (Minn. 1998)). 
 84.  Id.  
 85.  Id.  
 86.  Id. at 27 n.3. 
 87.  766 N.W.2d 317, 322–23 (Minn. 2009). 
 88.  Domagala, 805 N.W.2d at 27 n.3 (quoting Foss, 766 N.W.2d at 322−23).   
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Alholm v. Wilt89 was cited by the court in Domagala for the 
proposition that foreseeability is a threshold issue more properly 
decided by the court before the case is submitted to the jury.  But 
as a preface, the court in Alholm, in footnote dictum, also stated 
that it was troubled by the practice of submitting foreseeability to 
the jury.90 
A trial court following the supreme court’s guidelines will 
initially have to consider foreseeability in deciding whether the 
defendant owed a duty to the plaintiff.  Putting aside the variance 
in the foreseeability standards, a trial court may decide that the risk 
 
 89.  394 N.W.2d 488, 491 n.5 (Minn. 1986). 
 90.  The trial court in Alholm instructed the jury as follows: 
The defendant is required to use reasonable care in the operation of his 
business.  The defendant-proprietor may be involved in what is called 
negligence.  The elements necessary to prove an innkeeper’s liability 
under negligence are as follows:  
1st.  The proprietor must be put on notice of the offending party’s 
viscous [sic] or dangerous propensities by some act or threat.   
2nd.  The proprietor must have an adequate opportunity to protect 
the injured patron. 
3rd.  The proprietor must fail to take reasonable steps to protect the 
injured patron.   
4th.  The injury must be foreseeable [sic]. 
Id. at 489 n.3 (alteration in original).  The supreme court was responding to the 
trial court’s inclusion of foreseeability in its instruction, as pointed out in a later 
footnote questioning the practice: 
       Although not raised on this appeal, we are troubled by the practice 
of placing foreseeability within the jury’s domain.  The foreseeability 
issue, as a threshold issue, is more properly decided by the court prior to 
submitting the case to the jury.  If the trial court concludes that the 
innkeeper did not have notice of the person’s dangerous propensities, 
then it must find that the injury would not have been foreseeable to a 
reasonable innkeeper and thus, no duty to protect arose.   
       Because foreseeability has nothing to do with proximate cause, we do 
not believe that the jury should be instructed on the issue.  See, e.g., 
Prosser & Keaton on Torts § 43 at 280–81 (5th ed. 1984).  To the extent 
our prior case law speaks of “foreseeability” as an element of the cause of 
action, we were only discussing foreseeability in the context of whether a 
legal duty arises, not as something on which the jury should be 
instructed. 
Id. at 491 n.5.  The court’s statement that foreseeability should not be part of the 
instruction seems to be based on its conclusion, at least initially, that foreseeability 
has nothing to do with proximate cause.  Later Minnesota cases have blurred that 
line by taking the position that foreseeability is central to the proximate cause 
determination.  See Lietz v. N. States Power Co., 718 N.W.2d 865, 872 (Minn. 
2006); Canada v. McCarthy, 567 N.W.2d 496, 506 (Minn. 1997).  The last sentence 
of footnote 5 then connects foreseeability with duty, again stating that it is not 
something on which a jury should be instructed, but without stating why.  Alholm, 
394 N.W.2d at 491 n.5. 
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is clearly (not a close question) foreseeable or that it is not.  
Following the guidelines, a trial court finding that the risk is clearly 
foreseeable would then submit the negligence (breach) issue to the 
jury.  This is where the potential confusion arises.  If the trial court 
has decided that there is a duty because the defendant created a 
risk of foreseeable harm, and if Alholm is correct in stating that the 
foreseeability issue should not be submitted to the jury, the next 
question is how the case should be submitted to the jury.  If the trial 
judge instructed on the basis of the pattern negligence 
instruction,91 the jury would be asked to determine whether the 
defendant exercised reasonable care under the circumstances. 
That deliberation could include consideration of whether the 
risk to the plaintiff was foreseeable.  The pattern instruction does 
not specifically include foreseeability as a factor relevant to the 
breach determination, as do some pattern instructions.92  But 
nothing would preclude its consideration, unless resolving the 
foreseeability issue as a matter of law means that there can be no 
jury consideration of the issue or, perhaps, that the jury should be 
instructed as a matter of law that the risk of injury created by the 
defendant was foreseeable.  That seems unlikely. 
If the trial court determines that there is a close question 
concerning foreseeability, the issue would then be for the jury.  In 
 
 91.  See 4 STEENSON & KNAPP, supra note 7, § 25.10. 
 92.  California’s pattern instruction, COMM. ON CAL. CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS, 
CALIFORNIA JURY INSTRUCTIONS—CIV. 3.11 (2012), reads as follows:  
One test that is helpful in determining whether a person was negligent is 
to ask and answer the question whether or not, if a person of ordinary 
prudence had been in the same situation and possessed of the same 
knowledge, [he] [or] [she] would have foreseen or anticipated that 
someone might have been injured by or as a result of [his] [or] [her] 
action or inaction.  If the answer to that question is “yes,” and if the 
action or inaction reasonably could have been avoided, then not to avoid 
it would be negligence. 
New Mexico’s uniform jury instruction on negligence reads as follows: 
       The term “negligence” may relate either to an act or a failure to act. 
       An act, to be “negligence,” must be one which a reasonably prudent 
person would foresee as involving an unreasonable risk of injury to 
[himself] [herself] or to another and which such a person, in the 
exercise of ordinary care, would not do.   
       A failure to act, to be “negligence,” must be a failure to do an act 
which one is under a duty to do and which a reasonably prudent person, 
in the exercise of ordinary care, would do in order to prevent injury to 
[himself] [herself] or to another. 
N.M. R. ANN., CIVIL, UJI 13-1601 (West, Westlaw through Amendments Dec. 1, 
2012). 
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that event, there are two possibilities for submission of the case to 
the jury: either the pattern instruction on negligence could be 
used, or the jury could be specifically asked to determine whether 
the injury was foreseeable as a predicate to its consideration of the 
negligence issue.  If the jury is asked specifically to determine 
whether the risk was foreseeable, the issue then arises as to which of 
the varying standards the supreme court has set out should be used 
to determine when a risk is foreseeable.  The choice could be 
outcome-determinative. 
If the pattern instruction is used, the approach (at least as far 
as jury instructions are concerned) would be the same whether the 
court determined as a matter of law that the risk was foreseeable 
enough to find a duty, or that the foreseeability issue was close 
enough to submit the case to the jury.  The jury’s job would not 
change; the jury would have to determine whether the defendant 
was negligent under the circumstances. 
If foreseeability is disputed (the close case), however, it may be 
that the supreme court intends that the disputed foreseeability 
issue be resolved by the jury.  If so, the logical approach would be 
to ask the jury whether the injury or risk was foreseeable to the 
defendant.  If the answer is yes, the jury would proceed to 
determine whether the defendant was negligent in light of the 
foreseeable risk.  A no answer to the foreseeability issue would end 
the jury’s inquiry. 
B. Domagala’s Duty Determination—The Reasonable Care Requirement 
In Domagala, the supreme court concluded “that a reasonable 
person could expect that forcefully shaking a bucket attachment 
that was hanging vertically from a skid loader by one pin could 
cause injury to those in proximity to the skid loader” and that 
Rolland therefore “owed a duty to act with reasonable care to 
prevent injury to others as a result of his conduct.”93  Under the 
circumstances, that conclusion could perhaps satisfy either the 
Whiteford or Zylka standards, but the court may have applied a third, 
more general standard—whether a reasonable person could have 
anticipated a risk of injury under the circumstances. 
The next step for the court was to determine “whether the 
general duty of reasonable care can include giving a warning as an 
 
 93.  Domagala, 805 N.W.2d at 27−28. 
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exercise of reasonable care.”94  The court cited its decision in 
Hanson v. Christensen95 for the proposition that care has to be 
exercised commensurate with the risk, and a series of cases to 
establish the proposition that the duty to use reasonable care can 
be satisfied in a variety of ways, including warning of potential 
dangers.96  The reasonable care issue is typically for the jury.97 
The court then cemented its position on warnings: 
In fact, the jury is specifically instructed to consider how a 
reasonable person would react in a similar circumstance 
 
 94.  Id. at 28. 
 95.  275 Minn. 204, 205, 145 N.W.2d 868, 870 (1966).  That is a prosaic 
proposition noted in numerous cases.  Hanson was a case involving the duty of a 
proprietor of a place of public amusement, as were many other similar cases, but 
the concept is not so limited.  See, e.g., Glorvigen v. Cirrus Design Corp., 816 
N.W.2d 572, 582 (Minn. 2012) (holding that product supplier must exercise 
reasonable care commensurate with reasonably foreseeable risks); Ponticas v. 
K.M.S. Invs., 331 N.W.2d 907, 912 (Minn. 1983) (landlord’s duty in negligent 
hiring case); Ferguson v. N. States Power Co., 307 Minn. 26, 33, 239 N.W.2d 190, 
194 (1976) (duty of power company); Martin v. N. States Power Co., 245 Minn. 
454, 463, 72 N.W.2d 867, 872 (1955) (duty of power company); Hartmon v. Nat’l 
Heater Co., 240 Minn. 264, 272, 60 N.W.2d 804, 810 (1953) (products liability—
duty of manufacturer); Goar v. Vill. of Stephen, 157 Minn. 228, 233, 196 N.W. 171, 
173 (1923) (holding that it was the duty of village responsible for power lines to 
exercise reasonable care commensurate with the dangers involving high-voltage 
lines); Walker v. Holbrook, 130 Minn. 106, 110, 153 N.W. 305, 306 (1915) 
(medical malpractice); Fay v. Chicago, St. P., M. & O. Ry. Co., 72 Minn. 192, 193, 
75 N.W. 15, 16 (1898) (holding that it was the duty of railroad to exercise 
reasonable care commensurate with risks). 
 96.  See Domagala, 805 N.W.2d at 28 (citing Delgado v. Lohmar, 289 N.W.2d 
479, 484 (Minn. 1979)); Ferguson v. Benson, 309 Minn. 160, 166–67, 244 N.W.2d 
116, 119–20 (1976); Zylka v. Leikvoll, 274 Minn. 435, 449, 144 N.W.2d 358, 367−68 
(1966).  The supreme court has noted that the duty to use reasonable care 
includes an obligation to warn in numerous disparate cases.  See, e.g., Schroeder v. 
St. Louis Cnty., 708 N.W.2d 497, 511 (Minn. 2006) (Hanson, J., concurring and 
dissenting) (describing county’s duty to warn of dangerous road conditions); 
Olmanson v. LeSueur Cnty., 693 N.W.2d 876, 881 (Minn. 2005) (holding that 
county as property owner had duty to warn entrants of dangerous conditions); 
Steinke v. City of Andover, 525 N.W.2d 173, 177 (Minn. 1994) (describing 
landowner’s duty to use reasonable care to warn trespassers of artificial hidden, 
dangerous conditions); Parks v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 289 N.W.2d 456, 460 (Minn. 
1979) (holding that product manufacturer has duty to use reasonable care to warn 
of dangers inherent in use of product); Adee v. Evanson, 281 N.W.2d 177, 179–80 
(Minn. 1979) (describing landowner’s duty to entrant to use reasonable care to 
warn of obvious dangers if landowner could anticipate injury notwithstanding the 
obviousness of the danger); Mix v. City of Minneapolis, 219 Minn. 389, 395, 18 
N.W.2d 130, 134 (1945) (holding that municipality owes a duty to use reasonable 
care to warn or otherwise protect travelers from dangerous conditions such as 
pitfalls or traps). 
 97.  Domagala, 805 N.W.2d at 29. 
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and to find the defendant liable for negligence if the 
defendant failed to act as a reasonable person would.  A 
jury should be free to consider whether a reasonable 
person in circumstances similar to the defendant would 
warn others of foreseeable injury.  Therefore, we hold that 
when a defendant owes a plaintiff a duty of reasonable care, the 
defendant may exercise reasonable care by warning the plaintiff of 
impending harm.98 
The holding seems to suggest that the burden of proof or the 
burden of going forward in a negligence case is the defendant’s.  
While a defendant may owe the plaintiff a duty of reasonable care, 
however, the plaintiff still bears the burden of proving that the 
defendant failed to exercise reasonable care by the greater weight 
of the evidence.  One way for the plaintiff to do that is to show that 
the defendant should have warned the plaintiff of the risk of injury.  
Even if there is no warning, a jury may find that none was necessary 
and that the defendant was not negligent for failure to warn the 
plaintiff of the danger.  The italicized statement quoted above 
could be recast to state that when a defendant owes a plaintiff a duty of 
reasonable care, the plaintiff may establish that the defendant breached that 
duty by failing to warn the plaintiff of impending harm. 
In a footnote immediately following these holdings on the 
warning issue, the supreme court reiterated Rolland’s argument 
that permitting the jury to consider whether a reasonable person in 
Rolland’s position would have warned Domagala of the danger of 
approaching the skid loader circumvents the requirement for 
imposing a specific duty to warn in a negligence case—specifically 
the existence of a special relationship and foreseeable harm.99 
The court conceded that in the instant case Rolland “may be 
correct because, on remand, Domagala may argue to the jury that 
Rolland breached his duty of reasonable care by failing to warn 
Domagala of the bucket’s precarious position,” but noted that “the 
key difference between imposing a specific duty to warn under our 
special relationship jurisprudence and our holding today is evident 
in the element of breach.”100  The distinction, the court explained, 
is that “[i]f Rolland owed a specific legal duty to warn Domagala, 
failure to issue a warning could constitute a breach as a matter of 
 
 98.  Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
 99.  Id. at 29 n.4.  
 100.  Id. 
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law.”101  However, in the next sentence the court noted that “the 
duty of reasonable care may be satisfied in other ways.”102  And 
then: 
Because we hold that a defendant may breach the general 
duty of reasonable care by failing to give a warning, a jury 
is free to find that a defendant who failed to warn of 
impending harm was not negligent because the defendant 
acted in some other manner that mitigated the risk of 
harm to others.103 
This analysis seems to clarify the burden of proof, at least in part, 
but it raises two other issues.  It seems clear that a plaintiff may 
establish negligence by proving a negligent failure to warn.  The 
defendant may establish that he took measures to otherwise 
minimize the risk of injury, including, perhaps, removing the 
source of the injury.  But even if the plaintiff establishes that the 
defendant did not warn, and presents no other evidence, the jury 
should be free to find that failure to warn was simply not negligent 
under the circumstances, even if the defendant did not present 
evidence that he or she minimized the risk in some other way. 
The second problem is that the statement somewhat muddies 
the distinction as to the impact of general versus specific duties to 
warn.  The footnote seems to suggest that if there is a special duty 
to warn, failure to give a warning could effectively constitute 
negligence as a matter of law, whereas in a case involving a general 
duty to warn it would not because the defendant may have “acted 
in some other manner that mitigated the risk of harm to others.”104 
While that could be the case, it is certainly not always the case.  
The facts in Harper provide a good example, if they are altered to 
assume the existence of a special duty.105  Assuming the existence of 
a special duty, there would be two ways to look at the case.  One is 
that given the existence of a special relationship between Harper 
and Herman, Herman had a duty to warn.  He failed to do so and 
therefore is liable as a matter of law.  In the alternative, the special 
relationship imposed a duty to warn, but it would be for the jury to 
determine whether Herman was in fact negligent in failing to warn 
Harper of the dangers of a dive into shallow water.  A jury could 
 
 101.  Id. 
 102.  Id. 
 103.  Id. 
 104.  Id. 
 105.  See supra notes 46–47 and accompanying text. 
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readily conclude that Herman was not negligent—perhaps because 
it thought that the danger was obvious enough or should have been 
obvious enough to Harper that Herman was not negligent in failing 
to warn. 
Warning is one way of satisfying a duty to use reasonable care.  
The Restatement (Third) of Torts sections dealing with special 
relationships illustrate how it works.  Section 40 states that “[a]n 
actor in a special relationship with another owes the other a duty of 
reasonable care with regard to risks that arise within the scope of 
the relationship.”106  There is no automatic duty to warn.  Failure to 
warn is simply one way of establishing the breach, but not the only 
way, and failure to warn does not mean either automatic liability or 
that if there is a failure to warn that the defendant has to engage in 
some sort of “make-up” conduct to fill the void.  While the court 
may determine that there is a duty to use reasonable care, a trier of 
fact could well conclude that the defendant was simply not 
negligent. 
The problem is in assuming that a duty to warn flows 
automatically from a finding of a special relationship, or if there is 
a general duty to warn, that the defendant has to engage in some 
other conduct to ameliorate the risk if the defendant did not warn 
the plaintiff of that risk.  Even in cases where the law seems to 
dictate a warning obligation, however, absence of a warning does 
not mean that liability is automatic.  For example, products liability 
theory presumes the existence of a duty to warn of foreseeable 
dangers created by a product.107  But even if there is a duty to warn, 
the issue of whether a product manufacturer was negligent for 
failing to warn is a breach issue, which could be resolved either way 
by the trier of fact.  Deciding whether a manufacturer should have 
warned against a particular danger or whether the warnings given 
were adequate will turn on whether the manufacturer exercised 
reasonable care under the circumstances.108 
 
 106.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:  LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL 
HARM § 40(a) (2010). 
 107.  See Gray v. Badger Mining Corp., 676 N.W.2d 268, 274 (Minn. 2004). 
 108.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2(c) (1998); 4A 
Michael K. Steenson & Peter B. Knapp, MINNESOTA PRACTICE: JURY INSTRUCTION 
GUIDES - CIVIL, § 75.25 (5th ed. 2006). 
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C. The Supreme Court’s Conclusion 
In the second part of its opinion, the supreme court held that 
the district court abused its discretion in giving the no-duty-to-
protect and no-duty-to-warn instructions. 
The district court instructed the jury that one has a duty to act 
for the protection of another person “only if there is a special 
relationship between the parties and the risk is foreseeable,” but 
that no special relationship existed in the case and that the jury 
should not consider such a duty in its deliberation in the case.109 
The supreme court said that a correct statement of the law 
would read as follows: 
A person generally has no duty to act for the protection of 
another person when the harm was created by a third party 
[(the supreme court’s reframing of Harper v. Herman)].  
No duty to protect against harms created by others exists in 
this matter and you must not consider such a duty in your 
deliberation in this case.110 
Without that limiting language, the court said, a jury could 
conclude that Rolland owed no duty to Domagala, which would 
violate a basic principle of negligence law—that when a person 
creates a foreseeable risk of injury to another, an affirmative duty to 
exercise reasonable care to avoid causing injury to that person 
exists.111 
It is not clear whether the supreme court meant that its 
clarifying statement would be an appropriate substitute jury 
instruction, or only that the district court should have more 
accurately stated that there is generally no duty to guard against 
harms created by a third party.  Given the fact that such an 
instruction would seem to provide a jury with unnecessary and 
potentially confusing information, particularly the part concerning 
risks created by a third party, it seems more likely that the court 
simply intended to clarify the law without suggesting the general 
appropriateness of such an instruction. 
The supreme court also held that the district court erred in 
giving the duty to warn instruction.  That instruction first told the 
jury that special relationships giving rise to a duty to warn exist only 
for common carriers, innkeepers, possessors of land holding it 
 
 109.  Domagala, 805 N.W.2d at 30. 
 110.  Id. (quoting Bjerke v. Johnson, 742 N.W.2d 660, 664 (Minn. 2007)). 
 111.  Id.  
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open to the public, and persons who have custody of others under 
circumstances where the other is deprived of normal opportunities 
for self-protection.  Then, because the district court had ruled as a 
matter of law that there was no duty to warn, the jury was instructed 
that it should not consider any duty to warn in their 
deliberations.112 
The supreme court concluded that the first part of the district 
court’s instruction listing the special relationships that give rise to a 
duty to warn was not a material misstatement of the law, but that 
the instruction was unnecessary and was also confusing and 
misleading given that the parties agreed that there was no special 
relationship.113  The instruction was also in conflict with the 
supreme court’s holding “that a defendant who owes a duty of 
reasonable care may satisfy that duty by warning foreseeable 
plaintiffs of impending danger.”114  The instruction was inaccurate 
in foreclosing any consideration of a duty to warn and breach for 
failure to do so.115  The court held that the instructions were at best 
misleading on the duty and breach issues and were prejudicial.  
The court therefore affirmed the court of appeals and remanded 
the case to the district court for a new trial.116 
VI. LESSONS FROM DOMAGALA? 
The supreme court covered considerable territory in traversing 
negligence law in Domagala.  There are several lessons that can be 
drawn from the case. 
1. The supreme court clearly rejected the argument that there 
has to be a special relationship between the defendant and 
plaintiff in order for the defendant to have a duty to warn or 
protect the plaintiff.  Harper v. Herman does not stand for the 
proposition that a duty to warn exists only if there is a special 
relationship. 
2. That means that there should be no possibility that the 
Domagala dilemma will be repeated in cases where the court 
determines that a defendant has acted affirmatively in creating 
a foreseeable risk of injury.  A determination that the 
defendant owes a duty to the plaintiff should preclude any jury 
 
 112.  Id.  
 113.  Id. 
 114.  Id. at 31. 
 115.  Id. 
 116.  Id. at 31–32. 
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instructions qualifying the obligation of the defendant to use 
reasonable care under the circumstances. 
3. The duty in negligence law is one of reasonable care under the 
circumstances.  A duty to use reasonable care may arise when 
the defendant affirmatively creates a foreseeable risk of injury 
that imperils the plaintiff or where the defendant and plaintiff 
are in a special relationship. 
4. Section 321 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts is not an 
appropriate basis for finding duty—at least at this time. 
5.  The preliminary legal wrangling over whether the case is one 
of misfeasance or nonfeasance, and what the correlative duty is 
under the circumstances, should not change from current law.  
The supreme court maintained the distinction between 
misfeasance and nonfeasance.  Absent an exception, such as 
the special relationship exception, there is no duty to act in 
nonfeasance cases. 
VII.   QUESTIONS FROM DOMAGALA? 
There are several remaining questions in the wake of the 
opinion and perhaps some red flags. 
1. A defendant who is in a special relationship with the plaintiff 
owes a duty to the plaintiff to use reasonable care if the risks 
are foreseeable.  While the supreme court in Domagala 
discussed special relationships in cases where a third person 
creates a risk of injury to the plaintiff, there are cases where a 
special relationship will trigger a duty of reasonable care where 
the risk arises for reasons other than the action or potential 
action of a third person.  A simple example is the case where a 
special relationship exists between the plaintiff and 
defendant—as in the case of a patron who becomes physically 
ill at a restaurant—through no fault of the restaurant.  The 
risk is not created by a third person, but the restaurant 
employees would have an obligation to aid the plaintiff 
because of the special relationship.117  Domagala’s 
reformulation of Harper v. Herman will hopefully not be taken 
as the only case where special relationships may justify 
imposition of a duty of reasonable care. 
 
 117.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND 
EMOTIONAL HARM § 40 cmt. f, illus. 1 (Tenative Draft No. 5, 2012). 
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2. The variance in the supreme court’s discussion of the role of 
foreseeability in negligence law will create opportunities for 
potential confusion and inconsistency in application of the 
basic negligence standard.  While foreseeable risk is a key to 
duty determinations under Minnesota law, it is not clear how 
specifically foreseeable or objectively foreseeable the risk has 
to be.  The inconsistencies will remain absent a definitive 
decision establishing a set standard for resolving the issue. 
3. If foreseeability is a central question in a case, and a court 
decides that it is a “close” case requiring jury resolution, that 
same variance foreseeability standard also raises a question as 
to how juries should be instructed on the issue.  The narrower 
the standard (as in Whiteford v. Yamaha Motor Corp., U.S.A.), the 
more difficult the plaintiff’s burden of establishing 
foreseeability will be. 
4. In a nonfeasance case, the plaintiff will have to establish that 
there is a special relationship between plaintiff and defendant, 
or some other exception to the general no-duty rule.  It is 
important to understand that if a duty exists because of a 
special relationship, the duty is simply one of reasonable care 
under the circumstances.  The supreme court in Domagala 
seemed to suggest that a special relationship triggers an 
automatic obligation to warn, a burden the defendant could 
alleviate by showing that he took other precautions to lessen 
the risk to the plaintiff.  That seems somewhat confusing.  If, 
however, the existence of a special relationship simply means 
that the defendant has to use reasonable care for the plaintiff’s 
safety, the jury would presumably resolve the breach issue 
according to the pattern jury instruction on negligence.  The 
burden of proving negligence, whether through a failure to 
warn or otherwise, would remain the plaintiff’s. 
VIII.   A SIMPLE CONCLUSION 
Domagala v. Rolland is one of the supreme court’s more 
detailed analyses of negligence law in recent years.  It demonstrates 
the depth and weight of precedent in Minnesota law in resolving a 
case that was built on a premise that turned out to be false.118  
 
 118.  Leon Green’s observation over fifty years ago still seems relevant to the 
creation of Domagala’s dilemma: 
       The confusion of tongues in the English and American tort law is so 
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Reduced to its basics, the case, along with Minnesota negligence 
law, might be reduced to some simple principles. 
The first is that duty may be based on affirmative conduct that 
creates a risk of foreseeable injury or, in a nonfeasance case, on 
one of the exceptions to the usual no-duty rule, including where 
there is a special relationship.  The issue of duty is a question for 
the court.  Duty may sometimes turn on policy factors and it may 
sometimes turn on a court’s conclusion that a particular risk is not 
foreseeable as a matter of law.  Of course, a court’s resolution of 
the foreseeability determination is really also a policy decision 
insofar as it reflects a conclusion that the risk of injury created by 
the defendant is just too remote. 
When it comes to the role of foreseeability, the duty 
determination may be wrapped up in varying legal formulations, 
but there is no legal formula that gives an exact answer as to 
whether there will be a duty in a particular case.  The fact-
dependent nature of the inquiry guarantees that.119  Of course, 
 
great that the tendency is quite marked for advocates both on and off the 
bench to seize upon an attractive statement in an opinion, sometimes out 
of context or beyond the factual and issuable basis of the decision, and 
create out of the statement some principle to soothe or annoy the 
profession for years to follow.  Or it may be that some advocate or 
commentator hits upon a catchy phrase that is quickly taken up and 
made into a principle.  These principles become the stock in trade for 
rationalization of decisions.  It is rare that the environmental facts of a 
litigation, the decision of which is sought to be used as a precedent, are 
given adequate consideration.  Many of the great decisions of the 
common law are rationalized on the basis of dicta or on the basis of 
statements made by judges in cases arising in wholly different contexts.  
The search never ends for some neat formula by which the adjudication 
of a controversy can be made easy and simple.  Every tort lawyer is 
familiar with the formulas built around such terms as proximate, remote, 
reasonable, natural, direct, immediate, probable, foreseeable, and their 
numerous refinements.  These and similar terms have had their day 
when their very mention was supposed to unlock the mysteries of some 
complex case and produce an incontrovertible result.  They are 
embedded in our professional language and literature and will doubtless 
remain in our legal system to serve and to plague the profession as long 
as the common law is recognized as a means of settling disputes.  It is 
most remarkable how from time to time they seem to gain new life and 
appear in a new garb. 
Leon Green, Foreseeability in Negligence Law, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 1401, 1402–03 
(1961) (citations omitted).  
 119.  That is why the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL 
AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 7 cmt. j (2010), purges foreseeability from the duty 
determination and places it in the breach determination.  For a detailed look at 
the issue, see Steenson, supra note 75, at 1091–1108. 
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arguments may be made by analogy to other cases where the courts 
have found particular risks foreseeable, but rough equivalency of 
the facts does not guarantee a finding of duty.  Each case stands on 
its own. 
Negligence law would be somewhat simplified if the courts 
applied a consistent standard for determining whether a risk is 
foreseeable.  Until the supreme court takes a position on which of 
the standards governs the foreseeability determination, the 
inconsistency will remain. 
As far as the breach issue is concerned, it should not make any 
difference whether the duty exists by virtue of a special relationship 
between plaintiff and defendant and the existence of a foreseeable 
risk of injury, or because the defendant affirmatively created a 
foreseeable risk of injury to the plaintiff.  The duty is one of 
reasonable care under the circumstances.120 
If a court decides that there is a duty, the breach issue is 
typically for the jury, although a court may decide that the evidence 
of breach is insufficient to submit the case to the jury.  If the trial 
court submits the breach issue to the jury, there is no need to 
detract from the jury’s basic function—to determine whether the 
defendant (and plaintiff) exercised reasonable care under the 
circumstances—by loading the instructions with unnecessary 
statements extracted from appellate opinions that use language not 
intended to be used as jury instructions.121 
Cases may be hard because of facts and proof.  They should 
not be made harder by the law. 
 
 
 120.  There may be some variances.  In some cases the Minnesota Supreme 
Court has suggested or required that the jury determination on the breach issue 
may be guided by consideration of various factors.  See Erickson v. Curtis Inv. Co., 
447 N.W.2d 165, 169–70 (Minn. 1989); Peterson v. Balach, 294 Minn. 161, 174 n.7, 
199 N.W.2d 639, 648 n.7 (1972). 
 121.  See Vogel v. Nash-Finch Co., 196 Minn. 509, 516, 265 N.W. 350, 354 
(1936) (“The arguments and tests used in judicial opinions, even though good 
law, are not written for the purpose of being used as instructions to a jury.  The 
trial court, knowing the capacity of the jury, instructed relative to the same subject 
covered by the requested instruction very fully.”).   In Alholm v. Wilt, 394 N.W.2d 
488, 491 (Minn.1986), the supreme court indicated it had “noted that it is neither 
appropriate nor good policy for trial courts to use texts of reported decisions of 
appellant courts because, when used out of context, such texts are sometimes 
misleading.  See, e.g., Hovey v. Wagoner, 287 Minn. 546, 548–49, 177 N.W.2d 796, 
798 (1970).” 
